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INTRODUCTION
The ability to execute multiple transactions across 
a myriad of applications has made the Internet a 
prime platform for building Web applications. 
Applications like Facebook (Facebook, 2010) 
and MySpace (MySpace, 2010), attest to this 
popularity and have been rated as being the 
most popular social networking applications in 
the English speaking world. Increasingly, busi-
ness organizations are taking advantage of these 
social networking applications and other web 
applications to collect personal information about 
consumers and likewise consumers have shown 
a keenness for the web as a medium of com-
munication because of the interactivity and fast 
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On Mitigating Privacy Violations 
with Fault Tolerance
ABSTRACT
Self-protecting access control mechanisms can be described as an approach to enforcing security in a 
manner that automatically protects against violations of access control rules. In this chapter, we pres-
ent a comparative analysis of standard Cryptographic Access Control (CAC) schemes in relation to 
privacy enforcement on the Web. We postulate that to mitigate privacy violations, self-protecting CAC 
mechanisms need to be supported by fault-tolerance. As an example of how one might to do this, we 
present two solutions that are inspired by the autonomic computing paradigm1. Our solutions are cen-
tered on how CAC schemes can be extended to protect against privacy violations that might arise from 
key updates and collusion attacks.
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response time it offers. Yet, the same qualities of 
flexibility and interactivity that the web is famous 
for have become an impediment in the face of the 
growing incidences of data privacy violations. For 
example, in October 2010 a Wall Street Journal In-
vestigation revealed that many popular Facebook 
applications were transmitting consumer personal 
information to advertising and Internet tracking 
companies (Slattery, 2010), (Foremski, 2010). 
Cases like this have fueled growing concerns, 
on the part of consumers, that their data can be 
leaked without their consent to third parties. In 
this section, we discuss the context in which data 
privacy violations occur and why this happens in 
spite of the fact that access control mechanisms 
can be implemented to protect the information.
Context and Motivation
The Internet is built on the assumption that the 
users of the network can be trusted to behave 
honestly and so do not use the system or behave 
in ways that could compromise the performance 
and/or credibility of the system. Yet, this quality 
of open access makes web-applications inherently 
vulnerable to violations of information privacy 
rules (accidental or intentional) that can com-
promise the levels of data protection that these 
applications promise users (Harrison, February 
2007), (Sandhu, 2005), (Tanenbaum & Steen, 
2007). In many cases, privacy violations occur 
because consumers assume that they have “cor-
rectly” applied some access control mechanism 
that will prevent illegal access to their information. 
For instance, in social networking applications, it 
often is the case that a user will post “confiden-
tial” information and forget to set the parameter 
to prevent transitive disclosures to friends of the 
user’s friends.
As well, consumers have a tendency to naively 
assume that business organizations will do what 
they promise, while business organizations are 
sometimes unaware of the far-reaching conse-
quences of certain management decisions. In the 
case of Facebook, one could imagine that a third-
party made contact by indicating that they would 
like to test the popularity of a new application. 
Facebook probably agreed because usage of the 
application might attract new members. However, 
the acceptance agreement might not have indicated 
clearly that the application could not collect in-
formation about the users who choose to use the 
application and/or people whom the users know 
might be interested in using the application (Fung, 
Wang, Chen, & Yu, 2010). Data privacy leaks 
like the one we describe are a growing concern 
for organizations because they result in a loss of 
revue (Foremski, 2010).
Until recently, organizations simply focused 
on defining a security domain and security poli-
cies were used to control access to information. 
The assumption was that if correctly specified, 
failure (either deliberate or not), on the part of 
users, to adhere to data privacy policies would be 
unlikely. However, the emergence of concepts like 
service-oriented architectures and cloud comput-
ing have dissolved inter-organization boundaries. 
Consequently, web applications and/or services 
can interact flexibly across multiple security do-
mains and in ways that are not easy to predict at 
runtime. Therefore, security policies and access 
control schemes need to be modeled or extended to 
cope with situations in which changes in security 
requirements result in privacy violations.
In this chapter, we discuss the growing need 
to extend access control models to enforce pri-
vacy in scenarios involving changing security 
requirements like the Web. More specifically, we 
consider the literature on the more popular access 
control models like mandatory, discretionary, and 
role-based access control, and discuss some of the 
ways in which these models have been extended 
to enforce data privacy requirements. In recent 
years, cryptographic access control (CAC) is 
has received increased attention as a method of 
enforcing data privacy on the Web. CAC schemes 
have the advantage of providing protection for 
data in untrustworthy environments like the Web. 
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However, CAC schemes have been criticized for 
being impractical in terms of performance and 
so have not gained wide spread popularity. We 
postulate that data privacy is intertwined with de-
pendability and so, self-protecting CAC schemes 
can efficiently protect against data privacy viola-
tions if the CAC schemes are supported with fault 
tolerance solutions.
In order to extend CAC schemes to incor-
porate fault tolerance, we use the autonomic 
computing paradigm. The autonomic computing 
paradigm was proposed in 2001 by IBM (Corbi, 
2003), (Chess, 2005) and suggests that comput-
ing systems can be modeled to be self-managing 
and self-configuring. Self-management implies a 
reduced need manual management which is time 
consuming and self-configuration, the ability 
to adapt to new scenarios (Hart, Davoudani, & 
McEwan, 2007), (Huebscher & McCann, 2008).
Organization
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In 
Section 2, we discuss privacy and access control 
in the business context and consider how access 
control models have been extended in recent 
years to enforce data privacy on the Web. Section 
3 presents cryptographic access control (CAC) 
models in order to highlight the advantages of 
using these CAC schemes over standard access 
control schemes in privacy enforcement. Changing 
and conflicting security requirements on the Web 
make adaptability in an access control scheme a 
desirable quality in data privacy enforcement. In 
Section 4 we present two examples to show how 
the autonomic computing paradigm can be used 
as an inspiration for designing self-protecting 
CAC schemes. Future research directions and 
challenges are discussed in Section 5 and we offer 
concluding remarks in Section 6.
PRIVACY VIA ACCESS CONTROL 
IN THE WEB CONTEXT
The popularity of service oriented architectures 
(SOAs) and more recently, cloud computing, 
indicate that Mark Weiser’s vision of ubiquitous 
computing has become a reality in the business 
context (Weiser, 1999). More and more, business 
organizations are using the Web to collect personal 
information from consumers in order to find 
adequate responses to queries and/or provide the 
services that a consumer requests. Inter-service 
interactions often result in compositions that are 
not easy to predict and so there is growing concern 
about the potential violation of consumer data 
privacy (Byun & Li, 2008), (Ren and Lou, 2007).
Inter-domain information exchanges are 
handled, in general, within a trusted security 
framework. In SOAs and cloud computing en-
vironments it is difficult to predict how security 
policies belonging to different domains will be 
combined to enforce access control. Addition-
ally, verifying that the combination of security 
policies actually enforces the minimum access 
control requirements of the services and/or ap-
plications involved in accessing portions of data 
on the system is a challenging problem for manual 
security mechanisms.
In general, security models for access control 
on the Internet can be classified into one of three 
categories: discretionary, mandatory, or role-based 
(Tanenbaum & Steen, 2007), (Osborn, 2002), 
(Rjaibi, 2004). The discretionary access control 
approach allows a user to decide to whom they 
choose to authorize access and is a good access 
control approach for data sharing applications 
that users can join or leave spontaneously. In 
mandatory access control, access to data is regu-
lated by a lattice that is used to monitor the flow 
of information among communicating users by 
assigning labels to files to restrict accessibility 
to authorized users. This is a good approach 
for government and military organizations with 
stricter requirements of access to data. Finally, 
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role-based access control is popular in business 
organizations mainly because of its flexibility. 
Role-based access control combines the concepts 
of discretionary and mandatory access control, 
by allowing organizations to assign roles to us-
ers according to the permissions of access that a 
security administrator wishes to grant the user. A 
user can have one or more roles and these roles 
can be temporary or for the long term.
We use the example of a hypothetical e-
business application that relies on a data sharing 
environment to serve as a backbone for business 
operations. In this example, users can join or leave 
the social networking environment spontaneously 
and use the e-business application to purchase 
goods. Users are categorized into groups according 
to interest and a user’s group determines the privi-
leges of access (read, write, modify, and/or delete) 
that he/she is allowed. The advantage of using a 
social networking environment as a backbone is 
that it serves platform on which the e-business 
application can attract a clientele without the cost 
of advertising on regular channels like radio and 
television. Examples of real world data sharing 
applications include Chat Systems, Shared White 
boards, and “social networking” environments 
like Facebook, (Facebook, 2010), (Nazir, 2008), 
and MySpace (MySpace, 2010), (Besmer, 2009). 
In the following, we review the three models of 
access control, highlighting their pros and cons in 
relation to enforcing self-protection against data 
privacy violations.
Discretionary Access Control
The concept of discretionary access control (DAC) 
is probably as old as the concept of network-based 
or distributed computing. It basically rests on the 
principle that each user of a system should be 
able to decide on the privileges that are assigned 
to users wishing to view files that he/she created. 
The DAC principle is used in many data sharing 
web applications like Facebook, MySpace, and 
Flickr because it is simple and straight-forward to 
implement in a distributed environment like the 
Internet. Using a DAC mechanism gives users 
control over the access rights to their files without 
the need to comply with a set of pre-specified 
rules. When these rights are managed correctly, 
only those users specified by the file owner may 
have some combination of access permissions on 
the file (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003), (Tanenbaum 
& Steen, 2007) and consequently privacy viola-
tions are not possible unless the access rules are 
violated.
Consider the case in which a DAC model is 
used to enforce access control in a social network-
ing environment that serves as a backbone for 
an e-business application. As shown in Figure 
1, Jane can choose to create a folder containing 
files with photographs that she wishes to sell 
and make access available only to members who 
fulfill a certain number of criteria. For instance, 
Jane could decide that only the members of her 
photography club can have access to the files. So, 
as Figure 1 shows, John who belongs in Jane’s 
class can access the photographs that Jane makes 
available whereas Sam, who does not belong in 
her class, has no access rights.
An access control matrix is a simple but ef-
fective model for expressing and enforcing simple 
security policies in situations like the one de-
picted in Figure 1 (Gollmann, 2006). With an 
access control matrix, access rights can be defined 
individually for each combination of users and 
files/folders. The rules of access depicted in Fig-
ure 1, can be expressed using an access control 
matrix like the one given in Figure 2.
Although the DAC approach is a good way of 
providing a standard framework for enforcing 
access control in a social networking environment 
it has certain disadvantages that limit its ability 
to enforce privacy. An example of such a problem 
is the confinement problem that Lampson (Lamp-
son, 1973) cited, which is to determine whether 
there is a mechanism by which a user authorized 
to access a file may leak information contained 
in that file to users that are not authorized to ac-
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cess that file. Harrison et al. (Harrison, Munro, 
& Spiller, 2007) formally showed that the confine-
ment problem is undecidable due to the charac-
teristic of discretionary transfer of access rights 
between users in the DAC model. An added con-
sideration is that although the DAC model is ef-
fective for specifying security requirements and 
is also easier to implement in practice, its inabil-
ity to control information flow implies it is not 
well-suited to the context of Web-based collab-
orative applications where central control in some 
form is desirable (Jeong & Kim, 2004). Moreover, 
since users applying a DAC model do not have a 
global picture of the data on the system, it is dif-
ficult to take the semantics of the data into con-
sideration in assigning access rights so, informa-
tion might unknowingly be revealed to 
unauthorized users leading to privacy violations.
Mandatory Access Control
Apart from the confinement and information se-
mantics problems inherent in the DAC model, a 
key problem that the DAC model faces is vulner-
ability to Trojan Horse attacks (Bell & Lapadula, 
1973), (Biba, 1977), (Sandhu, R., 1993). In order 
to violate confidentiality and privacy, Trojan Horse 
attacks exploit two possibilities of access rights 
management:
• Changes in access rights to a file are han-
dled by the file owner and are not centrally 
controlled so a malicious user can mas-
querade as the file owner and grant read-
access to a file against the owner’s desire.
• Users authorized to access a file are typi-
cally allowed to create copies of the file, 
so a malicious user can create a copy of the 
file or part of it and grant read-access to us-
ers to whom the owner has not authorized 
access.
For instance, as shown in Figure 3, John can 
download information from Jane’s photographs 
folder and then proceed to make these pictures 
Figure 1. Discretionary access control
Figure 2. An example of an access control matrix
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available to Sam. Sam can then proceed to sell 
the photographs to an unscrupulous e-business 
owner or modify the photographs and post false/ 
damaging information about Jane.
The mandatory access control (MAC) model 
counters these threats by controlling access cen-
trally. An ordinary user (i.e., not the central au-
thority) cannot change the access rights a user has 
with respect to a file, and once a user logs on to 
the system the rights he/she has are always as-
signed to all the files he/she creates. This procedure 
allows the system to use the concept of informa-
tion flow control to provide additional security 
(Gollman, 2005).
Information flow control allows the access 
control system to monitor the ways and types of 
information that are propagated from one user 
to another which is an advantage for privacy 
enforcement. A security system that implements 
information flow control typically classifies users 
into security classes and all the valid channels 
along which information can flow between the 
classes are regulated by a central authority or se-
curity administrator (Denning, 1976). Therefore, 
privacy violations are more difficult to perpetuate 
than in the DAC model because information can 
only be shared in ways that are authorized by the 
security administrator.
In the MAC model, each user is categorized 
into a security class and the files are tagged with 
security labels that are used to restrict access to 
authorized users (Rjaibi, 2004). The example 
shown in Figure 3 can be extended to handle a 
security scenario in which a security administra-
tor prevents transitive disclosures, by the users 
accessing Jane’s Photographs Folder, by using 
data labels to monitor information flow. Each data 
object is tagged with the security clearance labels 
of each of the users in the system. As shown in 
Figure 3, by extending the discretionary access 
example we gave in Figures 1 and 2, a transitive 
disclosure could occur if a user, in this case Sam, 
gains access to Jane’s photographs folder because 
he belongs in John’s list of “friends”. The MAC 
model prevents such disclosures by defining a 
hierarchy, such as the one depicted in Figure 4, 
Figure 3. A case of transitive disclosures in the DAC model
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to monitor information flow centrally. The users 
are assigned labels according to their security 
clearance and information flow is regulated by 
authenticating a user and then granting access to 
the file based on their privileges. Since each file 
is labeled with a security clearance tag, so Sam 
can no longer access files that John downloads 
from Jane’s Photographs Folder because Sam does 
not have a security clearance that allows him ac-
cess. When the access control policy of a system 
is based on the MAC model, the security of the 
system ceases to rely on voluntary user compli-
ance but rather is centrally controlled, making 
it easier to monitor usage patterns and prevent 
privacy violations.
Multilevel Access Control
The multilevel security (MLS) model is essen-
tially a special case of how the MAC model is 
implemented for different contexts or scenarios. 
In the MLS model, a security goal is set and in-
formation flow is regulated in a way that enforces 
the objectives determined by the security policy 
(Rjaibi, 2004). Practical implementations of ac-
cess control schemes based on the MLS concept 
include the Bell-Lapadula (BLP), Biba Integrity 
Model, Chinese wall, and Clark-Wilson models 
(Rjaibi, 2004), (Bell & Lapadula, 1973), (Clark & 
Wilson, 1987), (Brewer & Nash, 1988), (Huang 
& Shen, 2004),(Liu & Chen, 2004). In the follow-
ing, we briefly discuss each of these four MLS 
models but for a detailed exposition of the field 
one should see the works of McLean (McLean, 
1990), Sandhu (Sandhu, R., 1993), Nie et al. 
(Mie, Feng, Che, & Wang, 2006), and Gollmann 
(Gollman, 2005).
• The BLP and BIBA models: In the BLP 
model (Bell & Lapadula, 1973), high level 
users are prevented from transmitting sen-
sitive information to users at lower levels, 
by imposing conditions that allow users 
at higher levels to only read data at low-
er levels but not write to it. On the other 
hand, users at lower levels can modify in-
formation at higher levels but cannot read 
it. This method of information flow control 
circumvents privacy violations but allows 
users at lower levels to write information 
Figure 4. MAC model – Information flow control to prevent privacy violations
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to files at higher levels that they cannot 
read. This can result in a situation where 
violations of data integrity are difficult 
to trace (Liu & Chen, 2004). So, a mali-
cious use can modify data to provoke vio-
lations of the data privacy policy that the 
access control scheme is meant to enforce. 
Violations to data integrity are a serious 
problem for privacy schemes because the 
corrupted data not only misinforms the 
user but can lead to inference of unauthor-
ized information. The Biba integrity model 
(Biba, 1977) addresses the problem of data 
integrity by checking the correctness of all 
write operations on a file. However, this 
approach opens up the possibility of pri-
vacy violations by inference of high level 
information from low level information.
• The Chinese wall model: In 1989, Brewer 
and Nash proposed a commercial access 
control model called the Chinese wall 
model (Brewer & Nash, 1988). The basic 
idea is to build a family of impenetrable 
walls, called Chinese walls, amongst the 
datasets of competing companies. So, for 
instance, the Chinese wall model could be 
used to specify access rules in consultancy 
businesses where analysts need to ensure 
that no conflicts of interest arise when they 
are dealing with different clients. Conflicts 
can arise when clients are in direct com-
petition in the same market or because of 
ownerships of companies. Therefore, ana-
lysts need to adhere to an access control 
policy that enforces a strict privacy policy. 
Such a privacy policy needs to prohibit 
information flows that cause a conflict of 
interest. The access rights in this model 
are designed along the lines of the BLP 
model but with the difference that access 
rights are re-assigned and re-evaluated at 
every state transition whereas they remain 
static in the BLP model. Unfortunately, 
their mathematical model was faulty and 
the improvements proposed have failed to 
completely capture the intuitive character-
istics of the Chinese wall security policy 
(Lin, 2000), (Lin T., 2006).
• The Clark-Wilson (CLW) Model: Like 
the BIBA model, the CLW model ad-
dresses the access control requirements 
of commercial applications in where data 
integrity is more important than data pri-
vacy and confidentiality (Clark & Wilson, 
1987). The CLW model uses programs as 
an intermediate control level between us-
ers and data (files). Users are authorized to 
execute certain programs that can in turn 
access pre-specified files. Security policies 
that are modeled using the CLW model are 
based on five rules:
1.  All data items must be in a valid state at 
the time when a verification procedure 
is run on it.
2.  All data transformation procedures 
need to be set a priori and certified to 
be valid.
3.  All access rules must satisfy the separa-
tion of duty requirements.
4.  All transformation procedures must be 
stored in an append-only log.
5.  Any file that has no access control 
constraints must be transformed into 
one with one or more access control 
constraints before a transformation 
procedure is applied to it.
The CLW model is more of a security policy 
specification framework that extends the concepts 
in the BIBA model to the general case. Therefore, 
like the Biba model, the CLW model is vulnerable 
to privacy violations that are due to inference of 
high level information from low level information.
Role Based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a combina-
tion of mandatory and discretionary access control. 
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In the role-based access control model, a role is 
typically a job function or authorization level that 
gives a user certain privileges with respect to a 
file and these privileges can be formulated at a 
high level (e.g. in simple English) or at a low level 
(e.g. formally specified and hard coded into an 
application). RBAC models are more flexible than 
their discretionary and mandatory counterparts 
because a user can be assigned several roles and 
a role can be associated with several users. Unlike 
the traditional DAC approach to access control; 
RBAC assigns permissions to specific operations 
with a specific meaning within an organization, 
rather than to low level files. For example, a DAC 
mechanism could be used to grant or deny a user 
modification access to a particular file, but it does 
not specify the ways in which the file could be 
modified. By contrast, with the RBAC approach, 
access privileges are handled by assigning permis-
sions in a way that is meaningful, because every 
operation has a specific pre-defined meaning 
within the application.
Dynamic role based access control (DRBAC) 
aims to extend the standard RBAC model to cope 
with situations that require adapting to changing 
security requirements. For instance, in context-
aware environments, a security policy might need 
to adapt its settings to cope with a change in context 
(Zhang & Parashar, 2004). Moreover, the DRBAC 
approach to access control is more flexible than 
the one in the DAC and MAC models in the sense 
that roles can have overlapping responsibilities 
and privileges, so users belonging to different 
roles may need to perform common operations.
RBAC assumes that all permission needed to 
perform a job can be neatly encapsulated so that 
the role in which a user gained membership is not 
mutually exclusive of others roles that the user 
already has. The operations and roles can be sub-
ject to organizational policies or constraints and, 
when operations overlap, hierarchies of roles are 
established. Instead of instituting costly auditing to 
monitor access, organizations can put constraints 
on access through DRBAC. For example, it may 
seem sufficient to allow all the users on the system 
(Jane, John and Sam) to have ‘view’ and ‘down-
load’ access to the Photographs Folder, if their 
accesses are monitored carefully to prevent viola-
tions of privacy. By using DRBAC, constraints can 
be placed on user access and context so that they 
do not tamper with contents of the Photographs 
Folder. However, role engineering is a challeng-
ing problem because guaranteeing data privacy 
requires a model that ensures data security and 
makes security administration less cumbersome 
than it currently is (Gollman, 2005). On the one 
hand, for stronger security, it is better for roles to 
be more granular, thus having multiple roles per 
user. On the other hand, for easier administration, 
it is better to have fewer roles to manage. Orga-
nizations need to comply with privacy and other 
regulatory mandates and to improve enforcement 
of security policies while lowering overall risk and 
administrative costs. Meanwhile, web-based and 
other types of new applications are proliferating, 
and the Web services application model promises 
to add to the complexity by weaving separate 
components together over the Internet to deliver 
application services.
An added drawback RBAC faces in privacy 
enforcement is that roles can be assigned such that 
conflicts are created which can open up loopholes 
in the access control policy. For example in the 
scenario in Figure 5, we can assume that Jane is 
the security administrator for the pay-per-view 
Movies Folder, and that she chooses to assign 
roles to users in a way that allows the users to 
either download or upload movies but not both. 
Now suppose that at a future date Jane decides 
to assign a third role that grants a user, say Sam, 
the right to veto an existing user’s (e.g. Alice’s) 
uploads. In order to veto Alice’s uploads, Sam 
needs to be able to download as well as temporar-
ily delete questionable uploads, verify the movies 
and, if satisfied, reload the movies to the site. So, 
essentially Sam has the right to both download 
and upload movies to Movies Folder, a role as-
signation that conflicts with the initial security 
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policy specification that Jane made. Security 
policy combinations or extensions like the one 
have just described need to be handled with care to 
prevent violations of privacy. Therefore extensions 
RBAC model to enforce privacy and incorporate 
adaptability to cope with scenarios of changing 
security requirements, need to be evaluated and/
or implemented with care.
Extensible Access Control Markup 
Language: A Privacy Discussion
In the previous sections, we presented and dis-
cussed some of the standard access control mod-
els highlighting the challenges that they face in 
handling scenarios of privacy violations on the 
Web. Although RBAC schemes offer a number 
of advantages over the DAC and MAC models in 
terms of security management, they too are not 
designed to prevent violations of privacy. The 
objective of this section therefore, is to explore 
extensions to the RBAC model as well as other 
access control paradigms for privacy enforcement 
on the Web.
The principal paradigm in distributed systems 
before the emergence of the World Wide Web had 
been the client-server architecture (Tanenbaum & 
Steen, 2007), (Gollman, 2005). The latter, in its 
simplest form, allows the server to protect informa-
tion by authenticating a client requesting access. 
Kerberos is an example of an authentication service 
designed for such an environment (Tanenbaum & 
Steen, 2007). This client-server architecture has 
however changed in many aspects. For instance, 
when a client looks at a web page, the client’s 
browser will run programs embedded in the page. 
So, instead of handling simple accesses either to 
an operating system or a database, programs are 
being sent from the server to be executed at the 
client side. Clients receive programs from servers 
and can store the session states in “cookies”. The 
Internet has also created a new avenue for software 
distribution via downloads that can sometimes 
result in privacy violations and so organizations 
have learnt, sometimes through the hard way, to 
restrict the kinds of programs that they allow their 
employees to download. As well, while the Internet 
has not created fundamentally new problems data 
privacy violations, it has changed the context in 
Figure 5. A case of conflicting access assignments
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which privacy needs to be enforced. Consequently, 
the design of access control paradigms is currently 
going through a transitory phase in which standard 
paradigms are being re-thought and evolved to 
cope with the scenarios that arise on the Internet.
Inherent in the current paradigm shift in de-
signing access control schemes, is the desire to 
allow users more control over how their personal 
information is managed (Ardanga et al., 2010). The 
main focus in terms of extending access control 
schemes for privacy enforcement has been on 
the Extensible Access Control Markup Language 
(XACML) and IBMs XML Access Control Lan-
guage (XACL). XACML is based on the eXten-
sible Markup Language (XML) (Chadramouli, 
2003). The Extensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML) is a general-purpose lan-
guage for specifying access control policies (Hu, 
Martin, Hwang, & Xie, 2007). In XML terms, it 
defines a core schema with a namespace that can 
be used to express access control and authoriza-
tion policies for XML objects. Since it is based on 
XML, it is, as its name suggests, easily extensible. 
XACML supports a broad range of security poli-
cies (Chadramouli, 2003), (Hu, Martin, Hwang, 
& Xie, 2007), and uses a standardized syntax for 
formatting requests so that any one of the follow-
ing responses to an access request will be valid:
• Permit: action allowed
• Deny: action disallowed
• Indeterminate: error or incorrect/missing 
value prevents a decision
• Not Applicable: request cannot be 
processed
As shown in Figure 6, XACML’s standard-
ized architecture for this decision-making uses 
two primary components: the Policy Enforce-
ment Point (PEP) and the Policy Decision Point 
(PDP). The PEP constructs the request based on 
the user’s attributes or credentials, the resource 
requested, the action specified, and other situation-
dependent information provided through a Policy 
Information Point (PIP). The PDP receives the 
constructed request, compares it with the appli-
cable policy and system state through the Policy 
Access Point (PAP), and then returns one of the 
four replies specified above to the PEP. The PEP 
then allows or denies access to the resource. The 
PEP and PDP components may be embedded 
within a single application or may be distributed 
across a network. This is an advantage for in-
corporating extensions for privacy enforcement 
because privacy enforcing security policies can 
be verified at the PEP. While user credentials can 
be checked at the PDP. The combination of both 
mechanisms makes privacy enforcement easier 
than in standard DAC, MAC, or RBAC mecha-
nisms and also allows for the establishment of a 
trust infrastructure where users can manage their 
identities and personal information.
In order to make the PEP and PDP work, 
XACML provides a policy set, which is a con-
tainer that holds either a policy or other policy 
sets, plus links to other policies. Each individual 
policy is stated using a set of rules. Conflicts are 
resolved through policy-combining algorithms 
which are good for handling cases of potential 
privacy violations that could result from combin-
ing security policies belonging to different do-
mains. XACML also includes methods of combin-
ing these policies and policy sets, allowing some 
to override others. This is necessary because the 
policies may overlap or conflict. For example, a 
simple policy-combining algorithm is “Deny 
Overwrites”, which causes the final decision to 
be “Deny” if any policy results in an “Overwrite”. 
Conversely, other rules could be established to 
allow an action if any of a set of policies results 
in “Allow”.
Determining what policy or policy set to apply 
is accomplished using the “Target” component. 
A target is a set of rules or conditions applied to 
each subject, object, and operation. When a rule’s 
conditions are met for a user (subject), object, 
operation combination, its associated policy or 
policy set is applied using the process described 
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above. The associated access control data for a 
given enterprise domain can then be encoded in 
an XML document, and the conformance of data 
to the enterprise access control model can be ob-
tained by validating the XML document against 
the XML schema that represents the enterprise 
access control model using XML parsers. These 
XML parsers are based on standard application 
programming interfaces such as the Document 
Object Model (DOM) (Wikipedia DOM, 2010), 
and the parser libraries are implemented in vari-
ous procedural languages to enable an application 
program to create, maintain, and retrieve XML-
encoded data.
XML-based, and other, access control lan-
guages provide capabilities for composing policies 
from scratch, by allowing users to specify access 
control policies, together with the authorizations 
through the programming of the language. They 
however lack a formal specification language 
for access control constraints (like historical-
based and domain constraints) that prevent as-
signing overlapping privileges. As an example, 
consider the case of constraints that require the 
manipulation and recording of access states (such 
as granted privileges). This is to avoid creating 
situations that result in users who were previously 
denied access to certain files being unknowingly 
granted access in a future state. Like most access 
control languages, XACML does not provide 
tools for the expression of historical constraints 
for historical-based access control policies, thus 
Figure 6. XACML access control model (Verma, 2004)
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leaving the completeness of the constraint logics 
to the policy writer. This case is similar to the 
one that was evoked in Section 2.2 where Sam 
unintentionally gets a combination of “view” and 
“download” rights with respect to photographs 
belonging to Jane that John downloads to his 
Photographs Folder.
Domain constraints are based on the semantic 
information pertaining to an enterprise context. 
Therefore a grammar-based language cannot deal 
with content-based constraints. Consequently, 
an XML schema is insufficient for a complete 
specification of the RBAC model for an enterprise 
since the latter contains content-based domain 
constraints. An example is not allowing more 
than one user to be assigned to the role of security 
administrator (role cardinality constraint) and not 
allowing the roles “viewer” and “uploader” to 
be assigned to the same user (separation-of-duty 
constraint).
XML schema provides a very extensible means 
for specifying document structures through a 
comprehensive type definition language. So, ad-
vocates for XML access control hold that XML is 
a good candidate for a linguistic framework that 
is needed to express an access control model that 
embodies multiple policy requirements.
Considerable effort has gone into extending 
XML-based security frameworks to express 
privacy policies based on the credentials users 
provide (Ardanga et al., 2010). For instance, recent 
extensions to XACML incorporate RBAC support 
for privacy enforcement (Ardagna, De Capitani 
di Vimercati, Paraboschi, Pedrini, & Samarati, 
2009). Other extensions include credential-based 
access control extensions to XACML to ensure 
that there is a framework to correctly authenti-
cate user access to data, but also enforce privacy 
(Ardanga et al., 2010).
Examples of proposals on extending XACML 
for privacy include the XACML-based privacy 
centered access control system that provides 
credential based management and privacy sup-
port as well as credential-based access control 
extensions to XACML (Ardanga, De Capitani 
di Vimercati, Paraboschi, Pedrini, & Samarati, 
2009) (Ardanga et al., 2010). The Ardanga et al. 
proposal combines XACML with PRIME (Privacy 
and Identity Management for Europe) to produce 
an infrastructure that handles access control in a 
way the enforces privacy policies flexibly. The 
PRIME system handles five aspects, namely, re-
source representation, subject identity, secondary 
use, context representation, and ontology integra-
tion. All of these aspects are used to specify the 
access control requirements and conditions that 
are used to release data to a user based on their 
role, or context. The ontology integration aspect 
allows the system to apply access control rules by 
using concepts defined in the ontology. This ap-
proach provides a first step in integrating privacy 
contraints into access control mechanisms while 
taking into account the context and role of the user 
requesting the access. In credential-based access 
control, the idea is to build a trust framework in 
which service providers use a user’s credentials to 
detremine what data to release to the user. Ardan-
gaet al. suggest that the specification of how these 
credentials are authenticated be based on some 
formalisation that determines which attributes 
of the information have to be disclosed and to 
whom. Therefore, a key advantage of credential-
based mechanisms is that they allow the user more 
control over their data and consequently gives the 
users more privacy.
However, it is worth noting that both creden-
tial and privacy based systems need some form 
of record of a user in order to decide whether or 
not to grant access to that data. This implies that 
a user needs to provide some information about 
themselves in order to access the data which in 
certain cases may expose them. For instance, in 
the pay-per-view movies scenario that we de-
scribed in Section 2.2 (see Figure 5), a user may 
not be comfortable with allowing Jane to know 
that they like watching “Horror” movies. So, if 
Jane bases access to the movies on a credentials 
system she may not attract as many clients as 
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she would have if she required less information 
to grant access to the movies. It is also worth 
noting that, as with the previous approaches that 
we discussed, the specification languages and/or 
frameworks assume a static environment where 
changes in access control policies are generally 
effected manually by a security administrator. 
When security policy combinations involve dif-
ferent domains handling the conflicts that arise 
might require dynamic adjustments to the com-
bined security policy. Resolving these conflicts to 
establish a global security policy that satisfies the 
minimum requirements of the security domains 
involved, requires an access control scheme that 
is able to redefine the constraint rules adaptively. 
While XACML provides features to specify a 
broad range of policies, a formal specification is 
still needed to define constraint rules adaptively 
in order to enforce privacy on the Web.
The common pattern inherent in all the ap-
proaches discussed above is the inability to pre-
dict privacy violation scenarios mainly because 
these approaches need to be extended to handle 
situations of changing security requirements 
adaptively. For instance, Norton’s Symantec Anti-
virus software is taking steps towards building 
pre-emptive anti-virus software that incorporates 
adaptability by using machine learning and data 
mining techniques. This is an indication that 
professional organizations also recognize the 
need for an evolution towards adaptive security 
mechanisms (Harrison, Munro, & Spiller, 2007), 
(Chess, 2005). Adaptive intrusion detection al-
gorithms are also still at a budding stage but the 
idea of moving towards schemes that can adjust 
to changing security requirements and enforce 
privacy is inherent in all these approaches.
Table 1 summarizes our discussion of the 
DAC, MAC, RBAC, and XACML approaches to 
access control in relation to privacy enforcement. 
From the table below, it can be noted that one of 
the key reasons that these models fail to enforce 
privacy effectively is that access control is typi-
cally handled from the server’s end. Therefore, 
users are not rights to allow them to manage their 
identities and privacy. The DAC model offers 
users some autonomy but as discussed earlier 
(see Figure 1, Section 2.1), poses a problem of 
information flow control.
This discussion illustrates that although no 
single access control scheme can be designed to 
handle every possible security scenario, web-based 
security scenarios are increasingly difficult to 
predict and control manually. Privacy violations 
Table 1. Comparison: DAC, MAC, RBAC, and XACML 
DAC MAC RBAC XACML
Control Point User Server Server Server/User
Authentication
(Control Point)
User Server Server Server/User
Review of Access Rights User Server Server Server/User
Access Right Propagation User Server Server Server/User
Access Right Revocation User Server Server Server/User
Information Flow Control None Yes Yes None unless security policy specified
User-reliant Security Policy Yes No No No unless authorized in security 
policy
Extension for Privacy No To some extent via in-
formation flow control
Possible through 
specialized role 
definition
Yes – Privacy policy specification and 
enforcement via the policy enforce-
ment point and the policy decision 
point
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typically arise because of mismanaged access 
control constraints and so the dynamic nature of 
the Web adds a further complication to the prob-
lem. In these cases, therefore, the needs for good 
security and consequently privacy enforcement 
are strongly intertwined with performance. This 
is because the delays created in trying to address 
new situations manually can be exploited mali-
ciously and so a lead to privacy violations. In the 
next section we consider cryptographic access 
control schemes as a method of enforcing pri-
vacy and consider some extensions to allow for 
adaptability in situations of changing security 
requirements. Cryptographic access control 
schemes offer the advantage of being simpler to 
model mathematically and so lessen the security 
administrator’s burden of security policy speci-
fication. In the next section we briefly explain 
how hierarchical cryptographic access control 
schemes are designed to work and proceed in 
Section 4 to discuss extensions for privacy en-
forcement and adaptability.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS 
CONTROL FOR PRIVACY 
ENFORCEMENT
Hierarchical cryptographic access control (CAC) 
schemes emerged as an attempt to design MLS 
models that are more general and capable of 
providing security in different contexts without 
requiring extensive changes to the fundamental 
architecture (Akl & Taylor, 1983), (Mackinnon, 
Taylor, Meijer, & Akl, 1985), (De Capitani Di Vi-
mercati, Foresti, Jajodia, Paraboschi, & Samarati, 
2007). For instance, in situations that require data 
outsourcing, CAC schemes are useful because the 
data can be double encrypted to prevent a service 
provider from viewing the information yet be able 
to run queries or other operations on the data and 
return a result to a user who can decrypt the data 
using the keys in their possession (De Capitani 
Di Vimercati, Foresti, Jajodia, Paraboschi, & 
Samarati, 2007). In this case, CAC schemes are 
a good way of enforcing privacy and improving 
the performance of the access control scheme. The 
performance improvements come from the fact 
the encryption ensures data privacy and saves the 
data owner from having to dedicate management 
resources to looking after the data.
CAC schemes are typically modeled in the 
form of a partially ordered set (poset) of security 
classes that each represents a group of users re-
questing access to a portion of the data on the 
system. Cryptographic keys for the various user 
groups requiring access to part of the shared data 
in the system are defined by classifying users into 
n disjoint security classes U
i
, represented by a 
poset ( , )S = , where S={U
0
,U
1
,…,U
n-1
} (Akl & 
Taylor, 1983). By definition, in the poset, 
U U
i j
=  implies that users in class U
j
 can have 
access to information destined for users in U
i
 but 
not the reverse. In the following paragraphs we 
present the two models on which CAC schemes 
are designed and discuss some approaches for 
performance improvements.
Hierarchical Cryptographic 
Access Control Models
Hierarchical Cryptographic Access Control (CAC) 
models are typically designed on the basis of the 
concept of posets and are generally divided into 
two main categories: independent and depen-
dent CAC schemes. Independent CAC schemes 
originate from the multicast community where 
the concern is securing intra-group communica-
tions efficiently. In these protocols, the focus is 
on how to manage keys within a group in a way 
that minimizes the cost of key distribution when 
the membership of the group changes (Yu, Sun, 
& Liu, 2007). The reason for updating the keys 
is to prevent users who have left the group from 
continuing to access information available to 
group members. This aligns itself with our theme 
of privacy enforcement because in essence, we 
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want CAC schemes to control access to the data 
by preventing all users who are not authorized to 
view information from accessing it.
Independent CAC schemes approach hierar-
chical access control by assigning each security 
class all the keys they need to access informa-
tion both at their level and below. Accesses are 
granted only if the user requesting access holds 
the correct key (Akl & Taylor, 1983), (Atallah 
& Frikken, 2006). While this method of CAC is 
easier to implement in practical systems because 
of its flexibility, the cost of key distribution as well 
as the possibility of violations, both security and 
privacy, due to mismanaged or intercepted keys, 
is higher than that in dependent CAC schemes 
(Hassen, Bouabaallah, Bettahar, & Challal, 2007). 
In fact, in the worst case scenario where all the 
keys in the hierarchy are updated, 2n+1 keys are 
redistributed (where n represents the maximum 
number of security classes in the hierarchy), 
making key re-distribution more costly than in 
dependent CAC schemes where only n keys are 
redistributed (Hassen, Bouabaallah, Bettahar, & 
Challal, 2007), (Yu, Sun, & Liu, 2007).
As shown in Figure 7 the data is encrypted 
to ensure that only the users in possession of the 
correct keys are allowed access. In order to access 
the encrypted data a user belonging say to Group 1 
will have to use the required key to download and 
decrypt the data to which access is sought. Since 
these keys might be available to several users at a 
time, each time the group membership changes, the 
keys affected by the change are replaced and the 
data reencrypted. This is to prevent the departed 
Figure 7. An example of an independent CAC model
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user from continuing to access the date. When 
a user who holds many of the keys departs this 
is a problem because it requires replacing and 
encrypting several portions of the data which is 
time-consuming. As well, as mentioned before, 
delays in encrypting the data can be exploited 
maliciously to provoke privacy violations.
A good way to alleviate these problems is to 
design the CAC scheme in a way that minimizes 
the number of keys distributed to any security 
class in the hierarchy. This model, typically re-
ferred to as the dependent key management (DKM) 
scheme, defines a precedence relationship between 
the keys assigned to the security classes in the 
hierarchy whereby keys belonging to security 
classes situated at higher levels in the hierarchy 
can be used to mathematically derive lower level 
keys. Access is not possible if the derivation func-
tion fails to yield a valid key. So for instance, in 
Figure 7, the data associated with Group 2 would 
be inaccessible to users in Group 1 if the assigned 
key does not allow them to mathematically derive 
the key with which the data at Group 2 was en-
crypted. This minimizes the cost of key assignment 
and distribution because a user only needs to hold 
one key from which all the other required keys 
can be derived. However, the problem of costly 
encryptions to cope with key updates remains 
(Hassen, Bouabaallah, Bettahar, & Challal, 2007), 
(Yu, Sun, & Liu, 2007), (Yu, Sun, & Liu, 2007). 
In Table 2 we summarize the differences between 
the independent and dependent CAC models in 
relation to the implications to privacy enforcement.
From Table 2, we note that the independent 
CAC model’s main drawback lies in the cost of 
key distribution while the dependent CAC 
model’s main drawback lies in the cost of encryp-
tion to cope with key updates. We also note, that 
either drawback does not help the case for pri-
vacy enforcement because encrypting large vol-
umes of data can be quite time consuming and so 
create a wide window of vulnerability during 
which the data is unprotected. A solution would 
be to withdraw the data and handle encryption 
offline but this creates a problem of data avail-
ability that might affect the system’s ability to 
meet its service level agreements (Meziane & 
Benbornou, 2010).. On the other hand with the 
independent CAC model, key distribution and the 
potential for interception also poses a privacy risk. 
When highly sensitive data is concerned this can 
become a serious problem because tracing illegal 
key usage is a challenging problem. For instance, 
if our hypothetical scenario of an e-business ap-
plication is extended to include a health insurance 
service, it would be unwise to implement a CAC 
scheme that increases the risk of exposure of 
patient data. In Section 3.2 we discuss some ap-
proaches that have been proposed to alleviate both 
the problems of key distribution and costly en-
cryptions to handle updates in group membership 
to ensure data privacy.
Other CKM Schemes
In order to minimize the amount of information 
distributed during key replacements variants of 
Table 2. Key management models: Comparison (Kayem, 2008) 
Dependent Model Independent Model
Security Fewer keys distributed More keys distributed
Encryption Cost More re-encryption Less re-encryption
Effect of Rekeying Changing one key implies updating the 
whole hierarchy
Change only affected keys, and distribute to 
users requiring the keys
Key Distribution Cost (Number of keys 
transmitted)
n keys 2n + 1 keys
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independent CAC model that appear in the litera-
ture (Shen & Chen, 2002), (Kuo, Shen, Chen, & 
Lai, 1999) propose ways of making key updates 
(distributions) easier and more secure by encrypt-
ing the keys that are to be distributed with a public 
key. The encrypted keys are then placed in some 
public location and a secret key is transmitted to 
each group. Access to a particular set of keys is 
only allowed if a user is in possession of the correct 
secret key. This makes it easier to exclude users 
that are compromised and reduces the number of 
keys distributed but the advantage comes at the 
cost of added public key information that increases 
the chances of an adversary correctly guessing at 
the secret keys being used (Crampton, Martin, & 
Wild, 2006).
Other approaches in the area of secure group 
communications have proposed batching key 
update requests to minimize the long term cost 
of rekeying (Li, Yang, Gouda, & Lam, 1999). 
Batching operates by accumulating requests for 
key updates during a preset interval at the end of 
which the keys are then replaced. Although this 
improves on the cost of rekeying, it widens the 
vulnerability window of the key management 
scheme.
Still along this line of batching key update 
requests, Crampton has suggested using lazy re-en-
cryption to minimize the cost of data re-encryption 
(Crampton, 2007). Lazy re-encryption operates 
by using correlations in data updates to decide 
whether or not to update a key and re-encrypt 
the old data when group membership changes. 
In this way, since data re-encryption accounts 
for the larger part of the cost of key replacement, 
re-encryption is only performed when the data 
changes significantly, after a user’s departure, or if 
the data is highly sensitive and requires immediate 
re-encryption to prevent the user from accessing 
it. The problem of having to re-encrypt the data 
after a user’s departure still remains. Moreover, 
if the file is a sensitive file that does not change 
frequently, lazy re-encryption can allow a mali-
cious user time to copy off information from the 
file into another file and leave the system without 
ever being detected.
More recently, Ateniese et al. (Ateniese, Fu, 
Green, & Hohenberger, 2006) have proposed an 
improvement on the variant of IKM schemes that 
Blaze et al. (Blaze, Bleumer, & Strauss, 1998) 
proposed in 1998 whereby proxy-reencryption 
is used to assign users access to particular files 
associated with another user or group. Basically, 
each group or user in the hierarchy is assigned 
two keys (a master key and a secondary key). 
The secondary key is used to encrypt files and 
load them into a block store where they are made 
accessible to users outside of the group. In order 
to access encrypted data from the block store a 
user must retrieve the encrypted data and present 
both the encrypted data and their public key to an 
access control server. The access control server 
re-encrypts the data in a format that is decryptable 
with the user’s secret key, only if the presented 
secondary public key authorizes them access. 
The problem of having to re-encrypt, update and 
distribute new keys when group membership 
changes remains.
Therefore irrespective of how a CAC scheme 
is designed, rekeying is handled by replacing the 
affected key and re-encrypting the associated 
data. Rekeying ensures that data privacy is always 
enforced but the rekeying process is time consum-
ing which increases the vulnerability window. 
As mentioned before, an increased vulnerability 
window size makes a CAC scheme susceptible to 
two issues: delayed response time in handling key 
updates and an increased possibility of privacy. 
In Section 4, we present two approaches to ensur-
ing privacy under changing security conditions 
without impeding performance. The first approach 
alleviates the cost of encryption by using data 
replication as a fault tolerance mechanism. Data 
replication is handled by predicting encryption 
and key update requirement. This indicates that 
by extending a CAC scheme to allow adaptability 
to a situation of changing security requirements, 
an access control scheme can meet its goals of 
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privacy. The second approach evokes the problem 
of collusion which basically occurs when two or 
more users gain access to unauthorized data by 
performing illegal key combinations. Our second 
proposition shows how one might prevent such 
violations of privacy by monitoring key assign-
ments to prevent collusion susceptible keys from 
being assigned to users.
SELF-PROTECTING 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC 
ACCESS CONTROL
Our self-protecting cryptographic access control 
scheme is based on the paradigm of autonomic 
computing. This paradigm emerged in a bid to 
design applications with the ability to adaptively 
handle scenarios of varying complexity (Keph-
art & Chess, 2005). From our discussions in the 
previous sections, it is safe to say that there is a 
growing need for access control mechanisms with 
the ability to adjust to new scenarios adaptively.
Autonomic Computing and Privacy
Security via the autonomic computing paradigm 
was first proposed by Chess et al. in 2003 (Chess, 
2005). In order to address the challenge of han-
dling complex situations for which security needs 
to be ensured, they suggest using the paradigm 
of autonomic computing that IBM proposed 
in 2001 (Kephart & Chess, 2003), (Kephart & 
Chess, 2005). The paradigm of autonomic com-
puting supposes that a system can be designed 
to self-regulate by using automatic reactions to 
defend, optimize and heal. The functions of an 
autonomic system are modeled using a feedback 
control loop that has two major components: the 
autonomic manager and the managed resource. 
The autonomic manager adjusts the behavior of 
the managed resource on the basis of recorded 
observations.
The autonomic model shown in Figure 8 is 
comprised of six basic functions: the sensor, 
monitor, analyzer, planner, executor, and effector. 
The sensor captures information relating to the 
behavior of the managed component and transmits 
this information to the monitor.
Figure 8. The autonomic computing feedback control loop (Kayem, 2008)
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The monitor determines whether or not an 
event is abnormal by comparing observed values 
to threshold values in the knowledge base. The 
analyzer, on reception of a message from the 
monitor, performs a detailed analysis to decide 
what parameters need to be adjusted and by how 
much, and transmits this information to the plan-
ner where a decision is made on the action to be 
taken. The executor inserts the task into a sched-
uling queue and calls the effector to enforce the 
changes on the managed resource in the order 
indicated by the planner.
Autonomic computing aims to provide surviv-
ability and fault-tolerance for security schemes by 
allowing access control schemes to self-manage 
and self-configure to minimize security viola-
tions (Chess, 2005), (Johnson, Sterritt, Hanna, 
& O’Hagan, 2007). Johnston et al. (Johnson, 
Sterritt, Hanna, & O’Hagan, 2007) propose a 
preliminary approach that uses reflex autonomic 
computing in the development of a multi-agent 
security system. This is an interesting approach to 
self-protecting security, but the authors indicate 
that real-world implementations of their prototype 
system would require additional security controls 
and the prototype do not allow a security class to 
operate independently. As Moreno et al. (Moreno, 
Sanchez, & Isern, 2003) have pointed out, the con-
nection to the rest of the system is lost. We note 
also that this work on autonomic access control 
focuses mainly on security policy definitions and 
restrictions on the messages sent and received 
by entities (users and/or agents) in the system 
as opposed to handling cases requiring some 
form of adaptability in the access control policy. 
Other approaches include trust and access control 
negotiation frameworks that are aimed at enforc-
ing privacy in conflict situations in collaboration 
environments (Ryutov, Zhou, Neuman, Leithead, 
& Seamons, 2005), (Smari, Zhu, & Clemente, 
2009), (Kuang & Ibrahim, 2009). The problem 
of designing adaptive access control schemes to 
support security policy definitions in ways that 
allow an access control mechanism to cope with 
changing scenarios still needs to be addressed.
Data Replication for Self-Protecting 
Cryptographic Access Control
We use an example of a simple read-intensive 
scenario to explain how data replication enhances 
the performance of CAC schemes in scenarios 
requiring key updates (Kayem, Martin, Akl, & 
Powley, 2008). Our CAC scheme is supported 
by a feedback control loop that is inspired by the 
autonomic computing paradigm (Chess, 2005). 
As shown in Figure 9, the CAC scheme can be 
supported by a framework that is structured in the 
form of an autonomic computing feedback control 
loop (see Figure 8). We note that this framework 
is formed simply by restructuring the model given 
in Figure 8 to suit the specific case of key updates.
The monitor module observes the behavior of 
the users on the system via a sensor that captures 
requests for key updates that are emitted either 
by a user or the security administrator. The 
monitor studies the rate at which key update re-
quest arrive over a given period and then transmits 
the information to the Analyzer module. At the 
Analyzer module, a computation to predict future 
the rate of future key update requests is made and 
this prediction information is transmitted to the 
Planner module. The Planner module computes 
the optimal number of resources (keys and en-
crypted replicas) that the security system needs 
to generate in order to cope with future key update 
requests. Once this is done a message is sent to 
the Executor module to generate the keys and 
replicas in anticipation of the key update requests. 
The Effector takes care of distributing new keys, 
making available new encrypted replicas, and 
deleting the old keys as well as the associated 
data.
An example of how this works is given in Figure 
10 where we have a situation in which the feedback 
control loop is embedded in the key server and the 
Monitor module observes user behavior during a 
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period W
1
. The information is transmitted to the 
Analyzer module after the observation period is 
over and it is determined that one rekey request 
is likely to arrive from User Group 1 during a 
future monitoring period W
x
. This information 
is transmitted to the Planner module where it is 
determined that in order to handle the rekey request 
one backup key and replica need to be generated in 
anticipation of this request. As depicted in Figure 
10 the key server, via the Executor module, cre-
ates a new backup key, for the User Group 1, and 
transmits this key to the Effector where it is kept 
in a secret registry. The Effector then generates 
a new copy of the data and encrypts it with the 
new key. When a request for a key update arrives 
from User Group 1, the Effector will proceed to 
destroy the old data and replace it with the new 
encrypted version. The users remaining in the 
group will then be sent a copy of the key needed 
to decrypt the new data. Copy consistency is not 
a real concern in this case because our example 
is one of a read-intensive scenario. Updates are 
only authorized by the security administrator. So 
by anticipating key update requests we can allevi-
ate the delays caused by key update requests and 
consequently avoid privacy violations that occur 
because of malicious exploitations of a wide 
vulnerability window.
Collusion Resolution in an Access 
Control Hierarchy
A common problem that leads to privacy violations 
in CAC schemes is the one that occurs when two 
or more users illegally compute a key to access 
information that they are not authorized to access. 
This problem also known as the collusion attack 
is one that all key management algorithms sup-
porting CAC schemes seek to avoid. Checking 
assigned key to ensure that collusion is avoided, 
is a challenging problem and particularly so under 
changing security conditions. For instance, it is 
difficult to check if a new key that is assigned 
in response to a key update request cannot be 
used to provoke a collusion attack. Therefore, 
guaranteeing privacy under these conditions is 
also a challenging problem. We propose solving 
this problem with a self-protecting scheme that is 
inspired by the autonomic computing paradigm.
Basically, as in the framework we described 
earlier to handle replication, we will create a 
framework that is structured in the form of the 
autonomic computing feedback control loop. In the 
Figure 9. An autonomic computing framework for handling key update requests
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framework key updates are handled preemptively 
by monitoring, via a sensor, the rate at which 
key update requests occur. This information is 
then used by the Analyzer module to determine 
which parts of the CAC hierarchy need new keys 
and new keys are selected in a way that prevents 
collusions from occurring. The Analyzer module 
then calls the Planner module to generate a rule 
set that represents the new hierarchy for the new 
keys. This information is shared with the Executor 
module that keeps track of the old hierarchy and 
the new hierarchy. When a key update request 
needs to be handled the Effector assigns the af-
fected user group a new key that is provided by 
the Executor module.
An example of how this can be done occurs 
when a hierarchy of keys is created using the key 
generation function that Akl and Taylor proposed 
(i.e.K K M
i
ti=
0
mod , where t
i
 is an integer 
value that is assigned to a security class and Mthe 
product of two large primes). In this case, the 
exponent set is V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9}. According 
to the Akl and Taylor scheme (Akl & Taylor, 
1983), the greatest common divisor (GCD) at 
level 1 is 1, level 2, 1 and level 3, 1; and since the 
GCDs at all three levels are the same, it implies 
that the keys at levels 1 and 2 will be collusion 
liable. We note also that in each of the cases col-
lusion is possible either because the combined 
GCD at a given level yields a value that is a divi-
sor of some or all of the exponents at the higher 
levels (here levels 0 and/or 1) or is a divisor of 
the combined GCD of the exponents at levels 0 
and/or 1. As shown in Figure 11 the monitor 
maintains a graph of the current key assignments 
and notes in this case that the potential assignment 
of keys K
2
 and K
9
 are likely to provoke collusions. 
This is indicated by the table (see Figure 11 – 
Monitor Module) that shows that collusions be-
Figure 10. Data replication and rekeying to handle update requests (an example)
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Figure 11. A feedback control loop framework for collusion resolution
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tween keys K
3
, K
4
, and K
9
 are possible because 
of the exponent choice.
In order to remove the collusion-liable keys, 
the collusion resolution algorithm, that is located 
in the Analyzer module, operates as follows. In 
the first step, the algorithm is executed for level 
0.
There is nothing higher than t
0
, t
0
 retains the 
value of 1. At level 1, as shown in Figure 11 (see 
Analyzer Module), the GCD {2, 3} = 1 which is 
equal to t
0
, this indicates that there is a possibility 
that the keys K
1
 and K
2
 that are formed from t
1
 = 
2 and t
2
 = 3 can be used to provoke a collusion 
attack. The collusion prevention algorithm, at 
the Planner Module, prevents this occurrence, 
by selecting a random value for t
2
 such that GCD 
{t
1
,t
2
} 6= 1 and both t
1
 and t
2
 remain multiples of 
t
0
. A randomly chosen value of 4 is selected and 
since GCD{2, 4} = 2 which is not a divisor of the 
GCD at level 0, and both are multiples of t
0
, t
2
 
retains the randomly assigned value of 4.
Likewise at level 2, as shown in Figure 11(see 
Analyzer Module), first t
3
 = 4 which has been as-
signed to t
2
, and GCD{4, 9} = 1 = t
0
, GCD{4, 6} = 
2 = t
1
 and t
5
 = 9 is not a multiple of t
2
. Hence, the 
collusion prevention algorithm needs to re-assign 
integer values to t
3
, t
4
, and t
5
 such that GCDs of 
the pairs of t
i
 at level 2 are not a factor of any 
GCDs at levels 0 and 1 and that additionally, 
the divisibility condition continues to hold. The 
random assignments in Figure 11(see Analyzer 
Module) present two possibilities of assignments, 
t
3
 = 12, t
4
 = 24, t
5
 = 36 and t
3
 = 6, t
4
 = 12, t
5
 = 24. 
So one of the sets is chosen and finally in the new 
assignment of exponents is such that collusion 
is prevented (see Planner Module – Figure 11). 
The Executor module is then called to construct 
the key graph (see Figure 11 – Executor Module) 
and make the new keys available to the Effector 
when the need arises.
It is obvious from this illustration that several 
different combinations would generate correct and 
valid independent sets. We could use a heuristic to 
control the size of the GCD of the exponent pairs 
at all of the levels in the hierarchy. However, we 
do not consider having different exponent sets to 
be a disadvantage but rather an advantage because 
different sets could be generated off line and at-
tributed when there is a demand for a new set of 
keys. This would be the case when a user joins 
or leaves the system and the original structure is 
maintained. In this way the method can in the best 
case contribute to an improvement in the efficiency 
of the key generation scheme (Mackinnon, Taylor, 
Meijer, & Akl, 1985).
The approach we adopt for identifying collu-
sion liable keys is to map the keys on to a graph 
where the vertices represent the keys and the 
edges the probability of their being combined 
to provoke collusions. Adjacent keys indicate a 
higher likelihood of attack than non-adjacent keys. 
A collusion removal algorithm that is based on the 
principle of computing an independent set from 
the vertices in a graph is used to remove collusion 
liable keys from a key set.
Using the independent set approach to resolve 
this problem shows that the problem of removing 
the collusion liabilities in a key set is similar to 
the classic graph theory problem of computing a 
largest independent set. As the problem is NP-hard 
(Levitin, 2003), a heuristic was used to achieve 
an efficient (but perhaps suboptimal) solution 
in polynomial time. Nevertheless, as illustrated, 
the solution is feasible. It should be noted also 
that it is a good idea to have this work with the 
data replication approach that we described in 
Section 4.2.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The open problems that emerge from our dis-
cussions in the preceding sections include the 
prevention of inference and covert channels and 
so we discuss each in a little more detail below.
Inference and Covert Channels: Inference 
and covert channels can be categorized as problems 
of internal and privacy violations. These problems 
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occur when a valid (authentic) user abuses his/her 
privileges either to transfer information to a user 
that is not authorized to view the information or 
to illegally gain access to data. Basically infer-
ence occurs when users are able to piece together 
information through legal access channels, in order 
to deduce information at another security level 
(Brodsky, Farkas, & Jajodia, 2000), (Farkas & 
Jajodia, 2002). Covert channels represent another 
manifestation of indirect violations of security 
policies in the context of hierarchical access 
control (Rjaibi, 2004). A covert channel refers to 
a transfer of information, from one level in the 
hierarchy to another, which violates the partial 
order between the security classes. This occurs 
when, for example, a higher level user employs 
their legal key to access information at their level 
and then deposits this information in a memory or 
storage location that can be accessed by the user 
with the lower security clearance.
Figure 12 depicts a scenario based on our 
hypothetical example of an e-business applica-
tion that uses a social networking environment 
(e.g. Facebook) as a backbone. In this case, we 
consider two examples where indirect access to 
information is achieved via inference channels and 
covert channels. A user, say, Alice, happens to be 
on the “friends” profile of several users. Imagine 
for instance that she seeks to obtain information 
on another user, say Bob, whose “friends” profile 
she does not belong to. She however is on John’s 
“friends” profile and John in turn is on Bob’s 
“friends” profile, so when Bob posts information 
to his “wall” (environment accessible by all his 
friends), John, can read the information. Now 
suppose that John comments on a message Bob 
has posted, Alice can, from reading information 
on John’s public space, infer information related 
to Bob. For instance, she may infer that if Bob is 
watching certain movies that he purchased from 
Jane’s pay-per-view service (see Figure 5) then 
Bob will probably be going out to watch a certain 
other similar movie at a certain time. Furthermore 
with a little cooperation from John, a covert 
channel can be opened between herself and John 
that allows her to directly receive all the updates 
Figure 12. Indirect information access via covert channels (Kayem, 2008)
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that Bob propagates. These weaknesses are not 
easy to handle with standard CAC schemes and 
also usually occur because of weakness in func-
tional, multivalued and join dependencies in the 
databases that support these systems (Brodsky, 
Farkas, & Jajodia, 2000), (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 
2003). Moreover, these weaknesses result in very 
subtle privacy violations that are difficult to detect. 
Handling problems like these manually is also 
challenging and time-consuming because it is hard 
to determine what kinds of inferences can be made 
from the information that is available publicly. We 
however, believe that embedding functions that 
allow access control schemes to adjust to new 
scenarios adaptively is a good starting point for 
addressing these problems.
CONCLUSION
The discussion in this chapter has been centered 
on the extensions that need to be made to standard 
access control schemes in order to enforce privacy 
on the Web. We highlighted the pros and cons of 
each one discussing also some of the extensions 
that have been made to some to cater to privacy 
needs on the Web. The most extensive work has 
been on the Extensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML) with proposals to incorporate 
privacy checking mechanisms. We noted that one 
of the challenges in enforcing privacy is the fact 
that the Web environment is inherently dynamic 
and so security requirements can change on-the-
fly. This can affect privacy enforcing schemes 
negatively leading to vulnerabilities that can be 
exploited maliciously. We noted also that some of 
the key problems that result in privacy violations 
include: inefficiencies in management of access 
control schemes and a lack of inbuilt mechanism 
to handle dynamic scenarios adaptively. More-
over, until recently, the assumption was that a 
well specified security solution will implicitly 
enforce privacy.
In this chapter we have shown, using two ex-
amples from cryptographic access control (CAC) 
schemes that the assumption that a good security 
scheme is privacy enforcing, is not always true. 
We proposed extending CAC schemes with an 
autonomic computing framework that is structured 
in the form of a feedback control loop to ensure 
self-protection, in a system, against privacy vio-
lations. Specifically we considered the problem 
of efficient key updates and looked at how to 
assign keys in a way that prevents collusion and 
also makes for less expensive data encryptions.
In order to address these concerns, we proposed 
embedding in the autonomic framework fault toler-
ance mechanisms like data replication and backup 
keys to anticipate key update requests. Replication 
is used to overcome the cost of encryption and con-
sequently overcome the associated risk of privacy 
violations due to delays in re-encryptions of the 
data with the newly generated keys. Backup keys 
are created and checked preemptively to prevent 
assignments that can lead to privacy violations 
through collusions between assigned keys. The 
collusion resolution strategy is to map the keys onto 
a key graph and then compute and independent 
set of the graph using a heuristic. The autonomic 
computing framework allows the CAC scheme 
to enforce self-protection by simply monitoring 
the rate at which key updates are required and 
generating keys as well as encrypted replicas to 
respond to the requests preemptively as opposed 
to on demand. The advantage of this approach is 
that it allows the access control scheme to adjust 
its behavior based on the scenario with which it 
is faced making privacy enforcement somewhat 
simpler.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Access Control: Method of protecting data 
from access by unauthorized users usually done 
by classifying users into groups according to 
privilege of access.
Autonomic Management: This a method of 
system management whereby a system is designed 
and/or implemented to be self-managing and self-
configuring to reduce the delays and risks of failure 
that are inherent in manually managed systems.
Cloud Computing: This is an Internet-based 
concept that is an extension of the service ori-
ented architecture concept whereby resources 
like memory, software and information are made 
available to users on demand.
Cryptographic Key Management: Access 
control model based on the assignment of cryp-
tographic keys that users can use to encrypt or 
decrypt data.
Data Privacy Protection: This is the con-
cept of designing access control mechanisms to 
ensure that the mechanisms protect data from 
being accessed by unauthorized users and also 
from being used in ways that violate the rules of 
access to the data.
Fault Tolerance: Ability of a system to cope 
with failure usually with some form of backup 
solution that ensures that the system is available 
to perform the tasks required of it on-demand.
Keywords: Data Privacy Protection, Ac-
cess Control, Cryptographic Key Management, 
Fault Tolerance, Autonomic Management, Self-
Protection, Cloud Computing.
Self-Protection: This is the ability of any sys-
tem, and in particular an access control mechanism, 
to protect itself from failure by using autonomic 
management to reduce human error and to provide 
efficient management.
ENDNOTES
1  The autonomic computing paradigm aims 
at creating systems that are self managing 
and self-configuring to reduce human error 
and make systems more efficient time wise.
